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Abstract
Theoretical models of multidimensional product dierentiation predict that in duopoly
rms dierentiate maximally along one dimension and minimally along the other di-
mensions. We experimentally reproduce a market in which rms can dierentiate their
products along two horizontal dimensions. The main result is that subjects do not
dierentiate their products and locate near the center consumers' distribution.
Introduction
A major issue in Industrial Organization literature is to determine rms' strategies
when technology allows for product dierentiation. It is well known that two products
can be horizontally dierentiated (Hotelling, 1929) when there is no ranking among
consumers based on their willingness to pay for the product, and vertically dierenti-
ated (Mussa, Rosen, 1978) when all consumers agree over the most preferred mix of
characteristics and, more generally, over the preference ordering. A typical example of
vertical characteristic is quality; with vertically dierentiated products, at equal prices
there is a natural ordering over the characteristics' space. In these settings, the main
question is the equilibrium degree of product dierentiation. With products dened
by one characteristic only (vertical or horizontal), research has determined that the
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1principle of minimum dierentiation (Hotelling, 1929) does not hold when models are
\well-behaved" (D'Aspremont et al, 1979, Shaked, Sutton, 1983). The rationale for this
result is that vertical or horizontal dierentiation are needed to relax price competition,
which should be erce if rms choose similar locations (Shaked, Sutton, 1982).
Recently, authors have explored the case of multidimensional product dierentia-
tion, for which products can be dened by two or more characteristics. Several models
have been developed. In Vandenbosch, Weinberg (1995) and Garella, Lambertini (1999)
products are dened by multiple vertical characteristics, while Tabuchi (1994), Econo-
mides (1986), Braid (1999), Irmen, Thisse (1998), Economides (1993), and Ansari et
al. (1997) analyze theoretical markets in which products are dened by n-horizontal
characteristics. Besides, Neven, Thisse (1990), Bester (1998), and Canoy, Peitz (1997)
assume products which possess both vertical and horizontal attributes. See, nally, De-
gryse (1996) for an example of application of theoretical framework in a context of a
real market.
The majority of these works suggest a general result in terms of rms' strategies:
in equilibrium, products are expected to be maximally dierentiated along one dimen-
sion, and minimally dierentiated along the other characteristics. This result has been
explained as follows: dierentiation along only one dimension is enough to relax price
competition, and rms can exploit the (demand) advantages of a central location along
the other dimensions. Central location means that rms tend to agglomerate towards
the center of consumers' distribution along the n   1 characteristics.
Notwithstanding, found equilibria are not unique; there are some analytical dicul-
ties in computing every subgame perfect equilibria at the location stage of the game
proposed. In addition, theoretical predictions on rms \strategies" in a context of mul-
tidimensional product dierentiation are dicult to test empirically, because of the lack
of data and agree among researchers about how to measure vertical and horizontal dif-
ferentiation. Recently, in order to ll this gap, some papers have dealt with experimental
analysis on product dierentiation, but so far, to our knowledge, no one has tried to
test a model of multidimensional product dierentiation by means of an experiment1.
Brown-Kruse et al. (1993) present theoretical and experimental results on spatial
competition between two rms. In their model, rms choose locations simultaneously
along a linear market, in the spirit of Hotelling (1929). Along the line representing
the market, identical simulated consumers are distributed uniformly. The aim of the
authors was, among others, to investigate the eects of communication among subjects
in deciding locations.
Subjects-sellers were randomly paired within each session and were told that they
would remain in those pairings throughout the experiment (this could have caused rep-
1The majority of existing experimental literature on spatial competition is based on voting models and
considers the behavior of candidates and voters in a spatial context. It should be noted that in voting models
there is no price competition.
2utation and path dependence eects) and no one was able to detect the identity of the
other seller in his market. The price they could charge was xed, with a linear trans-
portation cost to the consumer. In addition, subjects were given xed and variable
costs of production they would incur each period. There was one treatment in which
no communication was allowed between subjects, and another treatment where subjects
were allowed to engage in anonymous non-binding communication with the other seller.
Communication was allowed to be continuous and voluntary throughout the course of
the session.
The results reported are from 24 duopoly markets which involved 48 subject-rms.
The duration of a market was probabilistic and ranged from 4 to 15 trading periods.
The authors had previously found the set of strongly symmetric equilibria: Hotelling's
concept of minimal dierentiation is one of the many experimental outcomes that can be
supported by Brown-Kruse at al. (1993). Introducing non-binding communication, it is
also found that the set of equilibria contains both collusive and competitive outcomes if
the discount factor is suciently large. Without communication, subjects cluster near
the center of the market, and this occurs despite the fact that there are much more
lucrative equilibria. The authors conjecture that this result is due to the failure of
sellers to coordinate when they are unable to communicate, a conjecture supported by
the second set of experiments where communication was allowed: coordination at the
joint prot maximization quartile equilibrium was the overwhelming result.
Collins, Sherstyuk (2000) report the results of an experimental study of the three
agent location problem. In the case of three rms, no pure strategy location equilibrium
exists, as rst was noted by Lerner, Singer (1937) and formally shown by Eaton, Lipsey
(1975). Shaked (1982) determines the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for
the case of three rms and uniform (one-dimensional) distribution of consumers: the
only symmetric equilibrium is for each rm to locate randomly with equal probability
at each point in the middle two quartiles of the market2. Four experimental sessions
were conducted, each containing between 9 and 18 subjects, each lasting for 35 periods.
Subjects knew that the number of the periods was xed but were not informed of the
actual last period. As in the previous experiment, the subjects were asked to choose
their location from the set 0;1;2;:::;100, and the price of units sold was xed; therefore
competition was only in locations.
The ndings are consistent with the theory: the subjects did not cluster at the very
center of consumers' distribution and chose, most frequently, to locate in the central
quartiles of the market. However, the location choices were more dispersed than pre-
dicted by the theory: the agents often located in the out-of-equilibrium range. The
authors suggest three alternative hypotheses to explain the above phenomena: subjects'
2Osborne, Pitchik (1986) nd other asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria for this case and further charac-
terize symmetric location equilibria for arbitrary distributions of consumers along the market spectrum and
arbitrary number of rms.
3inexperience with the game, approximate equilibrium behavior, and risk aversion, but
only the latter explanation seems reasonable.
Barreda et al. (2000) use experimental methods to study product dierentiation and
price competition in a discrete version of the Hotelling (1929) game. The experiment
designed is characterized by the fact that is a two stage location and price game with
two sellers, there is a small number of location and price choices which leads to high
risk in subject's decision making, and it has been allowed to compare individual and
group decision making, and also the results with an odd or even number of possible
varieties. Beyond the standard argument in favor of the principle of minimum product
dierentiation conrmed by experimental results, further factors are identied, which
induce variety clustering associated with strong risk aversion. Collective players' strate-
gies are found to exhibit a stronger tendency towards agglomeration in the middle. In
the treatment with even locations it is observed higher prices and lower dierentiation
than in one with odd locations.
Finally, Garcia Gallego, Georgantzis (2001) test the predictive power the Bertrand-
Nash equilibria in a symmetric dierentiated oligopoly with multiproduct rms. Sub-
jects are not informed on the specication of the underlying model. In the presence of
intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to
multiproduct rms, strategies tend towards a non-cooperative multiproduct solution.
In this paper we take in consideration the model of multidimensional product dif-
ferentiation proposed by Irmen, Thisse (1998), in which products can be dierentiated
along two horizontal dimensions (in the general version of the model, products can be
dierentiated along several horizontal dimensions, but the general results do not change),
and we test the max-min product dierentiation outcome. In the second session we in-
troduce the theoretical model used in the computerized experiment, while in section 3
the experimental framework is described. In section 4 we show and discuss the main
ndings, and in the last section some concluding remarks are provided.
1 The Model
Irmen, Thisse (1998) investigate how rms dierentiate when there are many character-
istics of products, and how many characteristics are involved in the dierentiation pro-
cess, inspired by the preliminary results obtained by Neven, Thisse (1990) and Tabuchi
(1994). The main question is: in the case of n horizontal characteristics, do we observe
maximum or minimum dierentiation along all but one characteristics? Here we will
use the two-characteristics case, in order to make tractable the experimental procedure.
There are two rms in the market, A and B. The products' variants are given by the
rms' locations in R2. Firm's A location is described by a vector a = (a1;a2) whereas
rm B's location is given by b = (a1;a2), with a1;a2 2 [0;1]. There is a continuum of
4consumers distributed over the characteristics' unit square C = [0;1]2 according to a
nonnegative continuous density function g(z), where z = (z1;z2) is a consumer's address,
so that Z
R2
g(z)dz = N (1)
is the total population. It is assumed that g(z) is uniform and, without loss of generality,
the total population is normalized to 1. Consumers have a conditional indirect utility
function Vi(z), i = A;B: a consumer buying at A enjoys an utility equal to
VA = S   pA  
2 X
j=1
tj(zj   aj)2 (2)
where S denotes the gross surplus a consumer at z enjoys from consuming either variant,
and pA is the price of variant A. The last term of this expression is the square of the
weighted Euclidean distance between the consumer's ideal point and the location of
variant A; tj stands for the salience coecient of characteristic j. However, for simplicity,
we assume the same weights across consumers and characteristics (tk = t = 0:5).
Simulated consumers have unit demands. It is assumed that S is large enough for
all consumers to buy at the price equilibrium corresponding to any location pair. The
demand for variant A is then dened by the mass of consumers for whom variant A is





Any variant can be produced at the same constant marginal cost, which is normalized
to zero without loss of generality. Consumers indierent between purchasing product A




tj(zj   aj)2 = pB +
2 X
j=1
tj(zj   bj)2: (4)
Assuming that b=a, the slope of the indierent line is negative along each dimension.
Using this basic framework, we have determined the demand functions for A and
B considering all the possible cases, and we have introduced demand functions in the
experimental software. For details concerning the determination of the demand system,
see Irmen, Thisse (1998); the process is tedious, so we do not report it here3.
In the general case of n dimensions, the following results are showed by Irmen, Thisse
(1998). First, when all weights (tj) are equal, there are n local equilibria in which rms
choose maximum dierentiation along one characteristic and minimum dierentiation
3Deatils are available upon request.
5along the remaining ones. In this way, duopolists oer similar products but are still
able to relax price competition. Second, when there is a dominant characteristic, the
Nash equilibrium involves maximum dierentiation along the dominant characteristic
only; in other words, dierentiation in a single dimension is sucient to relax price
competition and to permit rms to enjoy the advantages of a central location in all
other characteristics.
In particular, Irmen, Thisse (1998) show that, assuming tk = t for all t, for each
k = 1;:::;n, there exists  > 0 such that
a = (1=2;:::;0;1=2;:::;1=2); b = (1=2;:::;1;1=2;:::;1=2)
is the only equilibrium of the rst stage of the game, if deviations by rm A (resp. B)
are restricted in a particular domain dened by
 1
2    < ai < 1
2 +  (resp. 1
2     bi < 1
2 + ) 8i 6= k
0  ai <  (resp. 1    < bi  1) if i = k:
Also, the authors show that some candidate congurations can be disregarded as possible
equilibria. Among these, a maximal product dierentiation where a = (0;:::;0), b =
(1;:::;1), can never be a location equilibrium4.
In the experiment, we have used the case of two characteristics and equal weights, in
order to better analyze the results. Of course, future research will take in consideration
other possible cases discussed in theoretical literature.
2 Experimental design and expected results
The experiment was computerized, and the software has been developed by the authors.
All computers (12) were connected through a local area network, and on a supple-
mentary computer of the network the master program was installed, controlling all the
experiment. Each player independently made his/her choice, and transmitted it to the
master program. The master program sent back to each player's screen the complete
information, and with this information players started the next period and decided on
their next strategy.
Sixty students in economics were recruited at the University of Trento, divided in
5 groups of 12 people each. During the experiments, each subjects was paired with
another subject, but each period he/she was paired with a dierent anonymous subject;
after ve periods (dened as follows according to the running treatment) the subjects
4Ansari et al. (1998) conduct a very similar analysis and they obtained identical results from the model
hypothesized: with two or three dimensions of products' attributes, rms maximize product dierentiation in
one dimension only.
6re-played with the same subjects, and so on. The randomization of pairs was made in
order to avoid reputation and path-dependence phenomenon. Individuals were sitting in
the same room, but they could not talk with each other, were separated and controlled
by the experimentalist. Each session lasted about 1 hour including instruction time.
Instructions (see Appendix B) were written on paper and distributed in the beginning
of each session. For each group of subjects three dierent treatments were organized.
The rst treatment (FT) best reproduces the theoretical model. Subjects had to
choose the location of their product in the characteristics' space dened by S = [100 
100]; in other words, students had to choose two varieties of the product: v1 2 [0;100]
and v2 2 [0;100]. After this choice, subjects were made aware about the location of
their opponent, and they also could see the location of both rms displayed on the
screen. At the second stage of the game, subjects were asked to price their product,
with p 2 [1;100]. After the price stage, the results in term of market share, prots, and
opponent choices were disclosed. This treatment lasted for 10 periods.
In the second treatment (ST) subjects were told to take the same decisions (v1;v2
and, at the second stage, price), but this time, after the rst period, there were 3 periods
in which they could change only the level of price, maintaining the same location. After
these price periods, they could relocate their product. This treatment lasted for 10
periods (that is, 10 choices of location and 40 choices of price).
In the third treatment (TT), subjects chose simultaneously product location (v1 and
v2) and price for ten periods; after the simultaneous choice of these 3 variables, they
knew about their prots and market share, and information regarding their opponent
was disclosed. Also this treatment lasted for 10 periods. Therefore, in aggregate, a player
chose for 30 times his/her location, and for 60 times the price of his/her product. At
the end of the experiment each subject was paid in cash according to his/her cumulative
prot. The maximum a student could earn was 50,000 ITL. In the following gure it is
shown an illustration of computer screen.
Theoretical predictions about the games described above are described as follows.
 Firstly, there is a qualitative predictions concerning rms' location strategies: sub-
jects are expected to locate in order to maximize dierentiation along one dimen-
sion and dierentiate along the other dimension. The result of max-min product
dierentiation implies an Euclidean distance between subjects equal to 100; that is,
for example, a = (0;50) and b = (100;50): as described in the previous section, if
salience coecients are equal, there exist n local equilibria in which both products
are dierentiated (maximally) along any single characteristic and bunched along
all the others at the center of the unit interval. This prediction is expected, in
particular, in the FT, because in this treatment the theoretical model is best re-
produced. Naturally, a backward induction process is assumed, even if it has been
shown that individuals rarely adopt it. In the ST, predictions remain unchanged:
the game theoretical solution for a nite repetition of the game would, by the
7Figure 1: Experiment user interface.
backward induction argument, prescribe in each repetition the same behavior as
the subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the source game5.
 In the TT, nothing can be said about theoretical predictions, because locations
are chosen at the last (and unique) stage of the game. In fact, as explained in
Economides (1987), any game structure where locations are chosen in the last
5Caplin, Nabelu (1991) have identied conditions under which both existence and uniqueness of the price
equilibrium hold. The existence of a price equilibrium depends on the functional form and the distribution of
consumer preferences. The utility function (2.2) is a special case of the utility considered by Caplin, Nalebu
(1991). Since the uniform distribution complies with concavity assumed by those authors, there exists a
pure strategy price equilibrium for any location pair. The demand functions are twice dierentiable and the
uniform distribution is log-concave, thus implying the uniqueness of the price equilibrium for each location
pair. This determines that, from the point of view of theoretical predictions concerning location equilibrium,
nothing should change passing from FT to ST.
8stage does not have a (subgame-perfect) equilibrium. The last treatment has been
organized for two reasons: rstly, it was interesting to analyze whether a dierent
subjects' behavior would emerge from such a dierent setting, which represents the
way in which sometimes markets operate; secondly, in cases like this, experimental
analysis shows to be a real alternative to theoretical analysis, when the last fails to
predict market characteristics. In fact, the result of no equilibrium with location
choice in the last stage of a game is a robust analytical result, but it does not
help to explain market characteristics when that circumstance occurs. However,
also considering other experiments' results, in the TT we expect subjects{rms to
choose more central locations.
 Since product dierentiation along at least one characteristic should relax price
competition, we expect the higher is the product dierentiation, the higher should
be the level of prices. Again, we measure product dierentiation as the Euclidean
distance between rms.
 In the theoretical equilibrium, when tk = t for all t, in each n local equilibrium
prices are expected to be equal to (or near to) t = 0:5 and rms are expected to
earn the same prots. This prediction derives directly from the theoretical model
(Irmen, Thisse, 1998).
3 Results and discussion
A total of 1800 observations of locations and 3600 observations of prices were recorded
during the experiment. Descriptive statistics for the data pooled by treatment and by
session are given in tables 3 and 3, where AvD is average product dierentiation (the
Euclidean distance between the two rms' locations), Sd is standard deviation, AvP is
average price, and Avp is average prots.
From table 3 it is clear that, in aggregate, the theoretical Nash equilibrium of max-
min product dierentiation does not have great explanatory power for the data. In
the course of the experiment subjects chose locations which tend towards the center of
consumers' distribution. This is described, in particular, by gure 2, where the data are
aggregated by session and by treatment, and where for each period the average total
dierentiation is computed.
A Wilcoxon sign-rank test ( = 0:05) conrms that product dierentiation is dier-
ent treatment to treatment; this result is conrmed also when the test is conducted by
session. From table 3 is also clear that price and prots are declining during the experi-
ment. However, prices and prots reach a sort of equilibrium (p ' 20; ' 50) after the
beginning of the ST, with the price keeping away from the theoretical equilibrium level
9AvD Sd Mode Median AvP Av
Nash Eq. 100 0 100 { 1 {
FT 31.74 21.53 0 27.69 39.74 161.63
ST 24.41 19.74 0 20.61 16.57 64.93
TT 18.50 18.36 0 13.47 16.92 64.07
Table 1: Summary statistics, data pooled by treatment
AvD Sd Mode AvP Av
s1 25.82 20.33 0 19.29 80.54
s2 29.74 23.14 0 17.14 66.98
s3 23.60 21.11 0 14.68 52.22
s4 25.26 19.64 0 33.60 135.25
s5 20.00 17.35 0 17.83 69.51


























































Figure 2: Average of total dierentiation. Data are aggregated by sessionon and by treatment.
The vertical lines are delimitating the treatments.
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Figure 3: Price average per period. Data are aggregated by sessionon and by treatment. The
vertical lines are delimitating the treatments.
Table 3 show that also between sessions there are signicant dierences (Kruskal{
Wallis test,  = 0:05). This is true for product dierentiation but also with respect to
the level of price. However, it is evident from table 3 that session 4 is responsible for
the statistical result. Conducting a Kruskal-Wallis test without session 4 leads to accept
the null hypothesis ( = 0:05).
Fig. 5, 6 and 7 illustrate all the locations treatment to treatment; it is possible to
see that subjects have chosen locations near to the center of consumers' distribution,
keeping away from the angles of characteristics' square.
Therefore, subjects rarely adopt the strategy described by theoretical predictions.
There are few locations given, for example, by (1; 1
2) or (0; 1
2). Subjects chose to aggre-
gate around the center of consumers' distribution, and this trend becomes stronger in
the course of the experiment.
From the point of view of \single variety choice", the majority of subjects chose
central locations for each variety (g. 8).
In general, students seem to choose a location v1 and v2 higher than 50 (this is true
for each treatment); this may be explained with the fact that individuals \think" about





































































Figure 4: Average prots per period. Data are aggregated by sessionon and by treatment.
The vertical lines are delimitating the treatments.



















Figure 5: Locations - FT. In the left plot a small random number is added in order to allow
the visualization of overlapping points. In the right plot data are binned in 10 by 10 classes.



















Figure 6: Locations - ST.

























































Figure 8: Variety distributions: the left histogram shows the v1 variaty distribution, the right
one the v2.
the varieties in terms of quality; note, however, that at the beginning of each session
students were informed that it was not so. Evidently, this was not sucient to avoid
the outcome described.
Product dierentiation decreases during the experiment: in the TT a distance between
































































Figure 9: Distribution of variety dierentiation in the three traitments. The line represent
the theoretical variety distribution when agents choose randomly.
Naturally, it should be noted that in the third treatment no result of max-min prod-
uct dierentiation was expected. However, also in the second treatment few subjects
14decided to locate apart from their opponents. Only in the rst treatment some attempts
to dierentiate have been observed, but they were too few to resemble the theoretical
equilibrium.
Apparently, there is no relationship between prices and product dierentiation, in the
treatments conducted (g. 10, 11, 12: each point represents the distance between each
pair of duopolists and the average price). This result is conrmed also if we analyze data
session by session. In ST and TT product dierentiation seems completely independent

















Figure 10: Price and dierentiation in FT. In the left plot a small random number is added in
order to allow the visualization of overlapping points. The background colour represent the
frequency. In the right plot data are binned in 10 by 10 classes.
Another exploration conducted analyzing the data individuals by individual has given
the same result: there is no relationship between prices and product dierentiation. On
the contrary, there is a strong relationship between average prices and average prots
(g. 13).
Brie
y, the main ndings of experimental analysis can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, aggregate results from the experiment are neither qualitatively nor statis-
tically consistent with the Nash equilibrium predictions. This experimental result is
particularly strong with respect to location choice. In general, subjects do not seem to
















Figure 11: Price and dierentiation in ST. In the left plot a small random number is added in
order to allow the visualization of overlapping points. The background colour represent the


















Figure 12: Price and dierentiation in ST. The background colour represent the frequency. In
the left plot a small random number is added in order to allow the visualization of overlapping
points. In the right plot data are binned in 10 by 10 classes.





















Figure 13: Price and Prots. Linear model: adjusted R-squared = 0.9777.
advantages of a central or quasi-central location inside the area representing consumers'
distributions on characteristics.
Following Collins, Sherstyuk (2000) and other works, we could argue that a possible
explanation of this phenomenon is due to risk aversion. Even if we have not conducted
an analysis in order to explore this possibility, we can conrm, after some discussions
with students after the experiments, that risk aversion was a fundamental cause of their
aggregation towards the center of consumers' distribution.
A possible explanation for dierences between the data and the equilibrium predic-
tion could be the subjects' inexperience with the game. But we have seen that, as the
game progressed, individuals chose location closer and closer the center of consumers'
distribution. Then the dierences between the behavior observed and the equilibrium
prediction can not be explained by subjects' lack of experience with the game.
Of course, given that Nash equilibria found in theoretical analysis are not unique,
one could argue that theoretical research should proceed on dening better the possible
equlibria resulting from a game structure as that used by Irmen, Thisse (1998) or Ansari
et al. (1998). However, it should be noted that the most likely equilibrium according
the theoretical analysis, that is, the equilibrium dened by maximum dierentiation
along one characteristic and aggregation at the center of the other characteristic, is a
very rare experimental result if we consider all the experiments conducted on this topic.
17Theory succeeds only when it predicts that rms will not maximally dierentiate along
both dimensions: in our experiment, eectively, this outcome occurs rarely.
Looking at table 3 and 3 above, it is clear that subjects need some periods to decide
their \preferred" strategy, although some practice sessions were run before the beginning
of each experiment. This could be the reason why we found a dierent result passing from
rst treatment to second treatment. However, in both cases a tendency to agglomerate
at the center of consumers' distribution is strong.
In the third treatment we do not have theoretical predictions, because the location
stage is at the last (and unique) stage of the game. Notwithstanding, experimental
results conrm that in this case the tendency to agglomerate at the center is stronger:
given that there are no Nash equilibria of the game, risk aversion is probably higher.
Dierently from theoretical predictions, in the course of the experiment higher prod-
uct dierentiation does not imply higher prices. In other words, product dierentiation
is not enough, at least in the experimental framework that we have utilized, to relax
price competition.
Finally, since there were no production costs, prices were expected to decrease to-
wards the parameter t, that in our setting was equal to 0.5. This was not conrmed
by experimental results. Prices are decreasing in the rst treatment, and they continue
to decline during the experiment, even if they seem to reach an equilibrium value. In
other words, a phenomenon of tacit collusion on prices seem at work. After the exper-
iment, students have conrmed that their attention was constantly paid to the level of
price: they could understand the eect of a low price better than the eect of a strategic
location. However, price did not decrease until the hypothetic \marginal cost".
4 Conclusions
Experimental analysis is helpful when theoretical models are complex and a straight
application of them to real markets is not possible. This is particularly true in the
case of multidimensional product dierentiation. In real markets products are normally
dierentiated along several characteristics, even if there are some examples of markets
with homogeneous goods (the stock market, some commodities market, and so on).
Although theoretical models of strategic product dierentiation have developed and are
becoming very complex and rened, it is not easy to evaluate their prediction strength
by means of empirical analysis.
For these reasons, in this paper we have tested the theoretical model of Irmen, Thisse
(1998) and Ansari et al. (1998), in which two rms compete in locations, dened by
several horizontal characteristics, and price. The most important prediction of these
models is that rms will dierentiate maximally along one horizontal dimension and
minimally along the others. In our experiment, we have carefully replicated the analyt-
18ical framework, which has been slightly modied in two treatments, in order to extend
the robustness of results.
Our results do not conrm the theoretical predictions formulated by Irmen, Thisse
(1998) and Ansari et al (1998), but they resemble previous experiments on location and
pricing: rms tend to agglomerate towards the center of consumers' distribution, in
order to exploit the advantages of a central location. Naturally, this is an experimental
result obtained in a controlled environment, and nothing can be said about how rms
behave in real world. However, the majority of other experimental results conrm our
outcomes, and these experimental result can be helpful in exploring the fundamental
issue of multidimensional product dierentiation.
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21Appendix
A Translation of instructions
A.1 First treatment
Consider a market in which a product can be dierentiated along two characteristics,
called v1 e v2. These two characteristics dene the \variety" (or \location") of the
product. There are many consumers in the market, and each of them possess an \ideal"
combination of varieties`, that is, an ideal value of v1 and v2. Therefore, since a product
is dened by v1 and v2, the utility of a consumer z who purchases that product is given
by
U = R   0:5(zv1   v1)2   0:5(zv2   v2)2   p
where R is a positive parameter which is the same among all consumers, zv1 e zv2
are the ideal values of v1 e v2 for the consumer z, and p is the price of the product.
Each consumer will buy the product which gives him/her the maximum utility U. In
other words, each consumer, in his/her purchase choice, will evaluate the \distance" (in
terms of characteristics) of market products with respect to his/her preferred location,
given the price at which the products are oered. Each consumer buys one unity of the
product. You are one of the two rms which are selling products in this market. The
market operates period to period; at the beginning of each period you have to choose
the \location" of your product in terms of v1 and v2, and the same for your opponent.
Then you both will know the decisions you have made, and you will have to decide
the price of your product. After the price choice, you will know which is your market
share, which will be graphically represented, your prots (given by the price chosen
multiplied by the quantity you have sold, because production costs are zero) and all
the information regarding your opponent (price, location, prots). Then, a new market
period will start, and you will be able to maintain or change your choices. Your goal
is to maximize prots, proportionally to which you will gain an extra earning (up to
35.000 ITL) as well as the xed remuneration. The values of v1 and v2 and price (p)
can vary between 1 and 100. In the course of the experiment you are not allowed to
communicate with anyone; if you have any doubt, pleas contact an experimentalist.
A.2 Second treatment
In this rst variant of the experiment, everything is the same, but this time, once you
have chosen the location of your rm (the two varieties) in terms of v1 and v2, and
in the second stage, the price, there will be 3 periods in which you can modify only
22the price of your product. After these 3 periods, you will be allowed to re-locate your
product.
A.3 Third treatment
Now you have to choose simultaneously the location and the price of your product;
in other words, at the beginning of each period you will be requested to choose v1,
v2 e p. After that you and your opponent have taken the decisions regarding these
three variables, you will know your market share, your prots, and all the information
regarding your opponent. Remember that your goal is to maximize your prots.
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